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INTRODUCT ION
Based on Standard and Poor's Composite Long-Term Stock
Price Index, eighteen stock price cycles (trough to trough)
occurred in the United States during the seventy-eight year
period 1871 - 19i;8' On the other hand, twenty-five business
cycles occurred during the period 1857 - 1961|. The number
of business cycles has been determined by Burns and Mitchell*^
between 1857 and 1938 and by Graham, Dodd, and Cottle^
between 1939 and 1962. Dates, duration and amplitude of the
stock prices and business cycles are presented in Tables 1
and 2 of the Appendix.
A study of Chart 1 on the next page suggests that some
correlation exists between stock prices and business activity,
but that the correlation often breaks down during short
periods of time. For example, in the recessions of 191+8-1^9,
1953-5l4» 1957-58 and 1960-61 the decline In business activity
wac not accompanied by a decline in stock prices of corres-
ponding severity. But over the whole period from 19i;9 to
1961, the correlation appears to be fairly close. Measured
from the low of 19^9 to the high of 1961, stock prices rose
k^ percent. During the same period, the Gross National
C. S. Cottle and W. T. Whitman, Investment TImlngt The
Formula Plan Approach
,
p. 3.
2
A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell, Measuring Business
Cyc les
,
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 19^7),
p. 70.
^B. Graham, D. L. Dodd and S. Cottle, Security Analysis
,
p. 23.
C:
c
•.-( y
B o
•iH o
f- CG
-O .—
[
r; r-<
5 •cH
E X
j-> 1
w >
!D 0)
> u
C a
•—
'
V
^^":
. ..
H -:£
!-
• O
5: >
». >
c w
to s
c
w.
+-> •
.,H • •—
1
x: ^ LfA
H; u
. rc •
TJ o a
C 5-
(0 a -
a ro
• <; JA
OO 0^
^ .—
*
CO (0
a) .-< •<
-' a. •
I- V
(0 cc c
x: — •—
(
O :3
C-" •*
•» I— >>
CO o c
'- u. ro
+J a
j-> Q) E
o .c o
(J H CJ
..
w
u
u
3
o
t/)
•u c
f- o
cc •tH
o Jj
CO
3
w •c
> t-e c
u o !_
w D-
V) X
w w .-^
c: CO
c —
1
—
1
1—
1
(_.
CD -uj
t_ to
Ci) 3
i cu
o
(D
U
OJ CO
^ >
jj <
tw »-H
o CO
.,-4
r- u
PO J-)
a) (,-1
E ^
•a
>. c
<—
t
^—
4
X".
j_; en
C CJ -
O c
r-:-.
o
-)
oQ
\
r50
- c-
jO
r
.tO
'2':
CO
U
(0 c
u o
tt) e
t3 1
cy ca
CIh c
o
w
x: x:
)-> ->
-^
-v ^
c
a) •o
cu
0) •->
C)^
(0 o
u •—
<
w a
>
< 1—
1
m
—4 «
<c U-.
.rf •—
-
u
*J p
w 6
^ •--15 *j
c u
>—
1
3
TJ
tn O
Ci) u
c IX
o
"-)
—J
I CU
>
.^
o uQ *J
(rt
CJ 3
x: •a
*j c
•—
I
Cf-.
O f^-.
o
V)
c K
o (0
•^ xs
*J c •
<0 •-< o
3 lA
J-> T3 O
o I- -(
3 CU 1
«--4 O ON
[s- cn^
o
>. (U ^
<-i >
.c ^ *t
^ CJ -—
.
c (Ti O':
o 5 f-^
^
I51IJ PU3 xiir-Q
Product, hereafter referred to as the GNP, increased from
$258 billion to $517.7 billion, corporate net income before
taxes rose from $35 billion to $kk billion and corporate net
income after taxes increased from $17 billion to $2k billion.
The National Bureau of Economic Research sponsored
several studies concerning the behavior of stock prices over
time. However, the studies did not investigate either
theoretically or empirically such questions as how stock
prices are determined, what factors are important in influ-
encing stock prices, what inter-relationship exists between
stock prices and GNP and how these factors exercies Lheir
influence in the short and long run.
This report will attempt to answer the following ques-
tions:
1, Do business conditions affect stock prices over
the long rtin?
2. If the answer to the first question i s in the
affirmative, what is the nature of this effect?
Business conditions will be operationally defined as
GNP. Standard and Poor's Long-Term Stock Price Index will
be used as the measure of stock prices. The Index is
available for a longer period of time (I87I to 1965) than
any other stock price index.
The relationship between stock prices and GNP will be
examined both theoretically and imperically. The theoretical
relationship will be established by using earnings as a
connecting link. An attempt will be made to show that
business conditions affect earnings and earnings affect
stock prices.
The relationship between GNP and stock prices will be
tested empirically. First, the correlation will be computed
between ten-year averages of GNP and ten-year averages of
Standard and poor's Long-Term Industrial Index for the period
1869 to 1958. Second, a linear regression equation will be
computed from the ten-year averages of GNP and Standard and
poor's Long-Term Stock price Index, with the latter used as
the dependent variable. The purpose of this equation will
be to measure the influence of business conditions on stock
prices. Third, the reliability of the regression equation
in measuring the influences of business conditions on annual
stock prices will be tested. The test will be conducted by
plotting the yearly data of GNP and stock prices for the
period 1926 to 1955 against the regression line. The closer
the fit, the more reliable will be the estimate of influence
of business conditions on stock prices.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The relationship between business conditions and stock
prices has not been fully explored, although a considerable
amount of literature about the problem is available.
Business cycles have been a favorite subject for economists,
and a great amount of work has been done in the area. The
best empirical study of business cycles has been made by
A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell.^ The two authors tested
five hundred monthly and quarterly economic series of differ-
ent periods and finally selected seventy-one of these series
on the basis of their performance as reliable indicators of
business conditions. Stock prices were selected as one of
these series. The problems connected with secular, seasonal
and random movements of the economic series, dating specific
cycles, basic measures for cyclical behavior, adjustments for
seasonal fluctuations, and cyclical behavior of different
time series were considered.
The works of L. W. Ayres*^ and many others are along the
same line. Closer to the subject of this paper are five
publications of the National Bureau of Economic Research
A. F. Burns and W. C. WItchcll, 0£. cit . , p. 1.
L. Ayrcs, Turning Points in Business Cycles, (New York;
The Macmillan Company, 1939).
written by G. H. Moore, ^ David Durand,^ Thor Hultgren,^ and
Julius Shiskin.^
Mr. Durand attempted "to measure the relative importance
of various factors that affect the market price of bank
stocks , . . VoTQ specifically ... to investigate the
factors affecting the ratio of market price to book value . . .
He started with the assumption that three primary factors—
namely, dividends, earnings, and book value affect bank stock
prices. The approach was quantitatively oriented. His most
interesting conclusions were (1) the influence exercised by
various factors on bank stock prices vary substantially among
banks in different locations, (2) only two primary factors
—
dividends and earnings--seem to play a systematic and easily
demonstrable role in determining stock prices.
Thor Hultgren attempted to determine the relationship
between corporate profits and business conditions. A few
important findings were: (1) the number of companies with
5
la
G. H. Moore, Statistical Indicators of Revivals and
Recessions, Occasional paper 31, NBER, 1950.
^^G. H. Moore, Measuring Recession, Occasional paper 61,
NBER, 1958.
^David Durand, The Bank Stock Prices and Bank Capital
problem. Occasional Paper 5U » NBER.
^hor Hultgren, Cyclical Diversities in the Fortunes of
Industrial Corporations, Occasional Paper 32, NBER.
^Julius Shiskin, Signals of Recession and Recovery,
Occasional Paper 77, NBER, 1961.
^David Durand, 0£. cit . , p. 1.
rising profits declines in late business expansion and in-
creases in late contraction, (2) turning points in profits
of individual companies cluster about turning points in
business, (3) there is limited predictive value of profits
for forecasting business cycles, and (k) there are always
some exceptions. He states that.
The quarter by quarter data indicate that in the
quarter with fewest rises during the great 1929-37
depression, 26 percent of the corporations had rising
profits. In the quarter of 1920»s most favorable to
profits, 23 percent had diminishing earnings . . ,
In every quarter of the 1920's the profits of at
least l6 percent of the companies were contracting
or at a trough. In every quarter of the 1930's, the
profits of at least 12 percent were expanding or at
a peak.
*
The purpose of G. H. Moore's work published in the
NBER's Occasional Paper 6l was similar to that of
Julius Shiskin's work published in the NBER's Occasional
Paper 77. Both dealt with the economic series that are
reliable in forecasting business cycles although the total
number of economic series examined was different In the two
works. In both cases, stock prices were considered one of
the reliable economic series.
Thor Hultgren, o£. cit
. , p. 11.
NBER means National Bureau of Economic Research.
Mathematical techniques have been extensively used in
the study of business cycles. Some authors^ have tried to
determine quantitatively the relative Importance of several
factors that they considered important In determining stock
prices.
J. K. Galbraith^ and Thomas Wilson^ have done extensive
research in attempting to explain the high prices ol stocks
during the period 19^11-1929. Galbraith's objective v/as to
find the reasons for the stock market crash in 1929, the
great depression that followed, and the letter's unprecedented
^*J. D. Williams, The Theory of liivestmcnt , (Cambridgcj
1938). '
^^M. J. Gordon, "Dividends, Earnings and Stock prices,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, Msy 19^9, pp. 99-106.
^*^J. Tinhergen, "The Method of Share-price Formation,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1939, pp. l53-l60.
l^Paul G. Darling, "A Surrogative Measure of Businsst
Confidence and its Relation to Stock Prices," Journal of
Finance VIII, September 1953. PP. 1B3-197.
*®Edwin Kuh and John R. K'"eyer, "Correlation and Regres-
sion Estiirates when the Dada are Ratios," Econometrica,
Oct. 195^, pp. IiOO-i|l6.
^•^T. W. Davis, The Analysis of Economic Time Series ,
(Bloomington, Indianst Princ'ipia Press, 19U1) , Chapt. 11,
pp. l499-$i+i+.
^J. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 19557^
^Thomas Wilson, Fluctuations In Income and Employment
with Special Reference to Recent American Experience and Post
V/er prospects
,
(Third Edition; New York: Pitman Publishing
Corporation, 191+8)
.
duration and amplitude. His work Is a satire on the Ignorant
but fanatical politicians, scholastic but misguided econo-
mists, and the enterprising but unscrupulous business
community. The investigation, though devoid of economic
Jargon, is highly penetrating.
Wilson tested the fundamental Keynsian postulates
empirically under the conditions that existed between World
War I and II, The factual economic information in the book
is useful in order to explain the fluctuations in stock prices,
A few authors have dealt more directly with the subject
of this study. Important among these src J. F. Weston,^
J. C. Clendenin and Maurice Von Cleave, ^ Ezra Solomon,^
F. Modigliani and U, H. Miller,^ Daniel Seligmen and
"J. F. Weston, "Some Theoretical Aspects of the
Construction of Formula Timing Plans," Journal of Business,
University of Chicago, Cxrt. 19^9.
J. F. Weston, "The Stock Market in perspective,"
Harvard Business Review, March-April 1956, pp. 71-8o.
2
J. C. Clendenin and Maurice VonClcave, "Growth and
Common Stock Values," Journal of Business, July i955> pp. 216-
217.
^Ezra Solomon, "The Economic Growth and Common Stock
Valu*is," Journal of Business, University of Chicago, July
1955, pp. 216-217.
'^Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost of
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,"
The Management of Corporate Capital, edited by Ezra Solomon,
p. l5i|.
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T. A. Wise,^ D. M. Lamberton,^ and G. S. Cottle and
W. T. Whitman. 3 The works of these authors provide the fron-
tier of knowledge of the relationship between business con-
ditions and stock prices. Some of them have discussed such
topics as the relationship between earnings and stock-prices
and the relationship between GNP and earnings. Trend lines
were fitted by Cottle and White by the least-square method
to show the secular rising trend of stock prices, earnings
and dividends. The rate of increase in the trend of all
three series was found to be approximately the same.
The present study will integrate various relationships
examined by the above authors for different purposes to pro-
vide a theoretical structure of the relationship between
stock prices and business conditions. Thus, the present
study will provide an inter-related, theoretical and analyti-
cal basis for the subject. Up to the present, only frag-
mentory work has been done in this area. The correlation
between stock prices and GNP and a regression equation in-
cluding the same variables will be computed on a long-term
basis for the purpose of examining emperlcally the content of
^Daniel Seligman and T. A. Wise, "New Forces in Stock
Market," Fortune, Feb. 1961;, p. 92.
D. M. Lamberton, "Economic Growth and Stock prices -
The Australian Experience," bibliog. f. Journal of Business,
Jtine 1956.
3c. S. Cottle and W. T. Whitman, 0£. cit .
uthe theoreticil structure. This computed relationship will
be tested on an ex post basis for single years during a
period. Thus, the present study will attempt to develop a
theoretical structure supported by empirical evidence.
. .
.*
. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
The examination of the relationship between stock
prices and GNP will be approached on a long-term basis. For
purposes of this study, long-term means: (1) the period
used for studying the relationship will be long (I869 to
1958) and (2) the figures for GNP and stock prices that will
be used to compute the correlation and the regression equa-
tion are ten-year averages of annual data.
The theoretical relationship between stock prices and
business activity will be discussed first. Then the con-
clusions will be tested empirically. In the latter part of
the chapter, the predictive power of the relationship be-
tween stock prices and business activity will be tested on
an ex-post basis. The period 1920 to 1955 will be used for
this purpose because a depression, an expansion (with
several short recessions) and one world war occurred during
this 36-year time span. No other period had such widely-
varying conditions.
The problem will be approached from the point of view
of the economy as a whole, although the examples and behavior
of individual firms may be cited to illustrate particular
points.
The procedure followed In the analysis will be to
examine three relationships:
1. business conditions and earnings;
2. earnings and stock prices;
13
3« slock prices and business conditions.
It may appear that the first two relationships are not
relevent to the study. However, understanding these two
relationships is essential for understanding the third.
Relationship Between Earnings and GNP
Theoretical Approach
An economy has a baffling and frustrating complexity
of relationships which are not generally understood in
totality. There are innumerable economic variables, many
of which change simultaneously. A change in one variable
affects many other variables; some are affected directly end
some indirectly. In many cases there is an intercorrclation
between these variables. Changes in economic variables do
not always follow a systematic and predictable pattern.
Among all the variables, the most important is m.an, whose
behavior is not always rational. This fact frustrates any
attempt to give the social sciences the predictability and
precision that the physical sciences possess. In such a
situation, it is not possible to determine either the channel
or the amount of influence of all factors on one another.
Thus, an examination of a causal relationship between two
variables in the economy usually will not give precise
results. The influence of many factors which are not likely
to be very important must be ignored.
Ik
The above problems exist In studying the fellitionship
between GNP and stock prices, GNP is conposed of various
elements such as wages, earnings and rent. Among all com-
ponents of GNP earnings alone has a strong direct influence
on stock prices. Other components of GNP may also affect
stock prices, but it appears that their direct influence is
so insignificant over the long run that they can be excluded
for the purposes of the present study.
A larger GNP in period X in comparison to period X-1
means a larger total sales and output. A larger sales in
period X in comparison to period X-1 means a larger aggre-
gate profit in period X (in comparison to period X-1) if the
margin of profit remains constant or becomes greater.
Theoretically, the margin of profit should not decline
because fixed cost per unit of output will decline with an
increase in production if there is idle capacity in the
economy. In the United States, a significant amount of idle
capacity will not be an unrealistic assumption in normal con-
ditions. Thus, a reduction in per-unit fixed cost (which
means per-unit margin of profit is larger) can be expected
with an increase in production.
There is a likelihood of an increase in per-unit variable
cost because a larger production will mean a larger demand
for some of the variable factors of production. And larger
demand of these variable goods and services m.ay push their
prices upwards. The increase in their prices will be
15
reflected !n an Increase In per-unit variable cost which
could tend to reduce per-unit margin of profit. However,
the increase in per-unit variable cost may not be so greet
as to offset the decrease in per-unit fixed cost because the
Increase in demand for variable goods and services may not
be sufficient in the short run to push their prices very
high. Even if the increase in per unit variable cost is
large enough to corapletely offset the decrease in per-unit
fixed cost, the margin of profit per unit of output will not
decline. Thus, a larger sales ordinarily means a larger
profit because margin of profit is not likely to fall.
Empirical Evidence of this Relationship
Through Secondary Sources
Empirical evidence corroborates conclusively the
theoretical relationship between GNP and earnings.
^'!^. Thor Hultgren in his empirical Investigation about this
relationship concludes: "Net earnings of ell corporations
combined rise in a business expansion and fall in a contrac-
tion. But not every corporation participates at every stage
in these broad swings." Increases in aggregate corporate
profits during periods of business expansion can he observed
in Charts 2 and 3 and Table 1, pages 16, 17, and 18 respec-
tively, GNP and earnings have increased over time despite
great temporary fluctuations and have usually fluctuated in
^Thor Hultgren, 0£. cit . , p. 1.
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Chart 2
Gross Xalional Product and Corporate Xci- Income before arA.
after Taxes, 1S09-19G0.
Yea
Source: Grehzr., 3., Dodd, D. L., and Cox. Liu, C- S.
Security .Analysis principles snd Techn.ique .
i[th ed. New York: i-.'cC-rEv/-Hi 1 1 Book Corr;pany, Inc,
Chart 3
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Table 1^
(Money In millions of doll ars)
GNP CORPORATE DIVIDENDS GNP
Year profits for
all industries in 1929
(billion dollars) (loss) prices
1957 UU0.3 i|7,601 13,1+68 230.8
1956 U19.2 36,1+68 11,832 212.6
1955 397.5 39,582 11,533 215.3
195U 363.1 38,507 11,196 206.7
1953 356.i| 1+3,1+95 11,219 199.9
1952 31+7.0 h2,S35 11,1+71 187.1
1951 329.0 28,130 9,1^61+ 171.1
1950 • 28J1.6
256.1
3l+,2i+8 9,305 I7I+.U
165.619ii9 31,207 8,285
19i|8 259.1+ 25,025 7,378 166.8
19U7 23I+.3 21,220 6,009 180.9
19U6 210.7 26,1+51+ 5,957 183.6
19U5 213.6 27,933 5,628 170.2
I9I4I1 211.1+ 23,280 5,512 15U.7
130.719U3 192.5 16.592 6,556
191+2 159.1 9,U72 7,236 121.0
19)41 125.8 7.236 5,639 111.0
I9I4O 100.6 l+,ll+i+ l+,63l+ 103.2
1939 91.1 7,777 7,281 109.1
1938 85.2 7,618 7,163 100.9
1937 90.8 5,500 5,896 91.4
80.81936 82.7 3,037 1^,788
1935 72.5 (639) 3,091 7i+.2
1934 65.0 (3,511) 3,851+ 76.1+
1933 56.0 (i+87) 6,092 89.5
1932 58.5 Data not available prior' to 1932
1931 76.1
1930 91.1
1929 10k. 1+
98.21928
Data 1lot available prior to 1928
^Source: Historical Statistics of the United States
Colonial times to 1957.
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the sarrte direction. During the period 1926 to 1957, only
the years 1938, 1939, 19l|6, 1950, 1953, 1955 and 1957 are
exceptions. So far as the period as a whole is concerned
there Is a remarkably good positive correlation between the
two.
Corporate earnings during the period 1909 to I960 were
5.3 percent of GNP. If this period is divided into two
parts, i.e., from 1909 to 1929 (the period preceding the
great depression) and from 1935 to I960 (the period follow-
ing the great depression), with the great depression period
excluded, some conclusions can be drawn that will prove the
assertion that the margin of profit need not go down as GNP
increases. These two periods, despite many structural and
institutional changes will have many similar factors such as
a world war, inflation, prosperity, relative stability and
recession. For the first twenty-one years (i.e. from 1909
to 1929) corporate profits averaged 6.1 percent of GNP.
For the period 1935 to I960, they average S*^ percent. In
the last six years of the period, i.e. from 1955 to I960,
they declined to 5 percent. This gives an impression that
corporate profits as a percentage of GNP are declining.
However, a little deeper probe will show a different situa-
tion. Earnings before taxes but after adjustment for inven-
tory profits and losses have had a remarkably constant rela-
tionship with GNP. Thus, when the margin of profit (after
20
adjustment for Inventory losses and gains) remains the same,
a higher GNP means a higher earnings.
In the case of an individual corporation, Mr. Hultgren
shows through the analysis of quarterly data that,
• . . in the quarter with fewest rises during
the great 1929-37 depression, 26 percent of corpora-
tions had rising profits. In the quarter of the
1920's most favorable to profits, 23 percent had
diminishing earnings ... In every quarter of the
1920's the profits of at least 16 percent of the
companies were contracting or at a trough. In
every quarter of the 1930's the profits of at least
12 percent were expanding or at a peak.^
It is important to note that when economic activity
begins to Improve, the number of companies witJi improving
profits is rising and continues to rise during the earlier
stages of business expansion. Long before the decline in
economic activity on the whole, however, the number of
companies with improving profits begins to diminish. The
fall in number continues to the end of the expansion in
business and on into the earlier stages of business contrac-
tion. Long before economic activity revives, however, the
number of companies with growing profits again begins to
Increase.
Thus, barring the behavior of individual firms, there
appears to be s direct relationship between GNP and earnings.
Both tend to vary in the same direction.
^Thor Hultgren, o£. cit
. , p. 11.
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Relationship Between Stock Prices and Earnings
Theoretical Approach
The price of a stock in a competitive market is deter-
mined like the price of any other commodity, i.e., by its
demand and supply. As the purpose here is to show the rela-
tionship between the stock prices and earnings, supply is
assumed to be constant. The demand of a stock is determined
by the expected rate of return. A buyer of stock anticipates
a return either; through dividends or appreciation of stock
prices or both.
At times Investments are highly speculative and bear a
considerable amount of risk. The anticipated rate of return
will have to be adjusted for the risk before the influence
of the rate of return on stock prices is determined. If
this is not done, the influence of the two variables. I.e.,
the rate of return and the amount of risk, cannot be
separated as both influence stock price. All factors should
remain constant, while one changes. But the trouble is that
before the risk component is removed from the rate of return,
it must be quantitatively determined. The measurement of
risk raises a number of problems that are difficult to over-
come, especially the element of subjectivity. The same
situation may appear more risky for one person in comparison
to another. Some persons enjoy gambling for several hundred
dollars while others fear to bet a few cents.
22
The same element of subjectivity Is involved in antici-
pating a rate of return from a particular investment project.
Some persons are more optimistic than others. A particular
investment may make a few persons anticipate a higher rate
of return than others. Thus the element of subjectivity
affects both the expected rate of return and the risk when
they have to be quantitatively determined. And unless they
are quantitatively determined, one cannot be precise about
the degree of influence of rate of return on stock price.
Still, it is quite reasonable to say that, assuming supply
is constant, the price of a stock that a buyer is prepared
to buy is determined by its expected rate of return. The
higher the rate of return anticipated, the higher v/ill be
the stock price.
Theoretically, it is not possible to determine the
relative influence of dividends and retained earnings on
stock prices. But several studies liave been made to deter-
mine emperically the relative influence of the two on the
stock prices. Although it is not necessary for this study
to determine precisely the relative influence of dividends
and retained earnings on stock prices, yet the determination
of the relative importance of the two will give us some more
insight into the problem of discerning the effect of earnings
on stock price*.
23
Empirical Evidence
There are many empirical works which show the Influence
of earnings on stock prices. The Influence of earnings on
stock prices has been shown through (1) dividends, (2) re-
tained earnings, and/or (3) total earnings. Mr Durand has
made •'.
. . a series of estimates of the relative importance
of dividends and earnings as determinants of market price in
relation to book value." His conclusions follow:
Thus in group 2, i|, and 5» the weight for
dividends exceeds the weights for book value and
for earnings In all years, which implies that
dividends ranks first among the three factors in
its effect on the market prices of most of the
stocks in these groups. But in group 1, consist-
ing of New York City bank stocks, first place
goes to book value, whose weight exceeds that
for dividends in all years and that for earnings
in all years but one.
2
Other interesting findings were, "But it is certainly
true that none of these factors ^risk, asset, ratios,
reserves, stability of earnings, etc._7 exerted systematic
effects that were clearly discernible with the statistical
methods used."-^ The most Interesting conclusion of all was
"The study was unable to find a direct relationship between
bank stock prices and obvious measures of growth, such as
David Durand, o£. cit .
, p. 5.
^Ibid
., p. 16.
3ibid.
, p. 18.
2k
the rate of increase in bank earnings."^ He considered
growth and retained earnings as the same thing.
Although Wr. Durand did not find Bny influence of re-
tained earnings on stock prices, it is difficult to accept
his findings as conclusive. The common stock of Superior
Oil in 1957 sold at $2000 per share with |ijl|.71 in earnings
and without paying a dividend. In I960, it sold at |2165,
paying $7.50 out of earnings of $51.19. Texas Instruments
sold at $5 in 1954 and at $256 in 1959 without ever paying
dividends. Polaroid sold at $261 in I960 with a dividend
rate of only five cents quarterly and earnings of $3.
Some of the recognised growth companies supplement a low
cash dividend by more or less period stock dividends, e.g.
IW., r/any companies that have not been growing have main-
tained their prices through paying dividends. Railroads are
a good example. Thus it appears that the companies lacking
growth could maintain their prices by giving dividends while
companies that are dynamic and expanding can increase their
stock prices through retaining earnings and maintaining the
growth.
The Cowles Commission noted after observing the per-
formance of common stock prices over a period of sixty-eight
years (from I871 to 1938) that all stocks on the average
advanced in price at the rate of 1.8 percent while the
^IMd.
, p. 5.
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amount of earnings retained by corporations increased by 2.5
percent. "This means that every $2.50 of earnings retained
by a corporation has, on the average, been associated with
an increase of $1.80 in the value of its stock. "^ The
Commission suggested "undervaluation" as a possible reason
for this loss to the stockholders.
Mr. Hugh Pastoriza^ examined Ik utility companies and
concluded that out of the total increase in stock prices,
17 to 31 percent could be accounted by undistributed earnings
On an average, 25 percent of the increase in stock prices is
explained by undistributed earnings. This finding has been
supported by Harold H. Young.
3
It is not intended here to discuss in detail the channel
of influence of earnings on stock prices. The influence
might be through either dividends or retained earnings; or
earnings in toto may have a more distinct effect on stock
prices. For the purposes of the present study, the precise
distinction among the influences of the dividends, retained
earnings and total earnings on stock prices is relatively
unimportant. Dividends and retained earnings themselves are
^Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, Common-
Stock Indexes, (Bloomington, Indiana: Princlpia press. Inc.),
p. U2.
'^Hugh Pastoriza, "Valuing Utility Earnings Distributed
and Retained," Analyst Journal, July 19ii5.
•5
-^Harold H. Young, "Factors Influencing Utility Price
Earnings Ratios," Analyst Journal, January 19l+5»
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determined by earnings in the long run. Dividends cannot be
maintained for long in the absence of earnings. Retained
earnings are deteririned by earnings and dividends. For our
purposes, the relative influence of dividends, retained
earnings and total earnings Is of secondary Importance so
long as the total influence of all three arc considerable
on stock prices. It Is quite Justifiable to say that
earnings influence stock prices.
Molodovsky^ fitted trend Hnca by the least squares
method for stock prices and earnings and found that both
have an upward slope. Stock prices had an annual rate of
growth of 1.99 percent and earnings an annual rate of growth
of 2.13 percent. The Cowles Commission Study has suggested
"that the discrepancy^ was due to undervaluation of common
stocks in the market during I871-I936." However, under-
valuation probably was not the only reason for this dis-
crepancy between the rates of increase in stock prices and
earnings because Cottle and '.Vhitman found 3«2 percent annual
rate of increase in stock prices and 2.2 percent in earnings
for the period 1889-1949 by fitting trend lines. (See
Cl'iart kt page 27). Thus in the case of Cottle and White,
^N. Molodovsky, "Valuation of Common Stock," Readings
in Financial Analysis and Investment Management, edited by
E. M. Lerner.
'^The word discrepancy means here the discrepancy be-
tween the level stock prices ought to have reached on the
basis of reinvested earnings and actual stock prices.
'*'
27
IT.
CD
^
.-, cJ
d r
u o-^
(0
^" o
r v^
ro v/J
in
Ci.'
-:3- *<
•(-> o
u ^'
c/:!
a
(/5
tt) Vh
o
CO
c
C)
XJ
a.
< c
• VI V)
TD —
<
*J
Ci) O (/)
• —
"
ni
-a ro
- o .^
W-.
u. o u
c^' 5 c
> c « w
t- ( : c
u o ~.
—1 x: u.
o
00
J2T Tor
28
the rate of increase in stock prices exceeded the rate of
Increase in earnings which is opposite to the findings of
Molodovsky and the Cowles Commission. It is quite possible
that the different periods used in the three studies caused
the conflicting results.
Relationship Between GNP and Stock prices
Earlier it has been shown that there Is a definite re-
lationship between earnings and GNP on one hand, and
earnings and stock prices on the other. Thus, if GNP in-
fluences earnings and earnings influence stock prices,
theoretically It appears logical that GNP influences stock
prices. It need not be disturbing to find an inter-
correlation between GNP and earnings. For example, earnings
in period X may influence GNP In period X + 1, The larger
GNP in period X + 1 (which was influenced by earnings in
period X) will also mean larger earnings In the period
X + 1, and larger earnings v/Ill favorably influence stock
prices. Thus, the existence of inter-correlation between
earnings and GNP does not disturb the influence of GNP on
stock prices.
The relationship between GNP and stock prices will be
tested empirically by two methods. First, the correlation
betwef?n GNP and stock prices will be computed by the use of
statistical techniques. Second, a linear regression equation
will be derived from the data for a long period of time,
29
taking GNP as the independent variable and stock prices as
the dependent. If the results of the equation are reliable,
it implies that stock prices are a function of GNP.
Using the data shown in Table 2 (page 30), the computed
r ss .81;7 for the period 1869 to 19^8. The correlation is
significant at the five percent level.
Using the same data for the period 1869 to 1958 and
assuming a linear relationship^ between GNP and stock prices,
the values of the regression equation are ll|.23 +
.7U88 GNP
when GNP is expressed in number of billions of dollars.
This means that stock prices measured in terms of Standard
and Poor's Industrial Index should be equal to about seventy-
five percent of the number of billions of dollars of GNP
plus another l5 points. It is significant to note that the
values of the equation were found to be almost the same when
the annual figures of stock prices and GNP were used for the
years 1909 to 192? and 1933 to 19l|0. This indicates that
the long-term relationship may be reliable for shorter
periods also if (1) extraordinary periods like the 1929-33
depression are thrown out and (2) the periods are not
shorter than a year.
In a study similar to the present paper, Ezra Solomon^
has examined the relationship between the rate of growth of
^The validity of the linear relationship between GNP and
stock prices is shown in Chart 5, page 31,
'^Ezra Solomon, "Economic Growth And Common Stock Values,"
Journal of Business, University of Chicago, July 1955, p. 213.
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Table 2
Gross National product and Standard & poor's Industrial Index,
by Decades, 1869-1955.
Decade GNP Star
Indi
idard & poor's
istrial Index
(in billions) (1935-39 = 100)
1869 - 1878 $ 7.1 18.5
1879 - 1888 10.7 20.2
1889 - 1898 12.7 23.8
1899 - 1908 21.7 33.0
1909 - 1918 hO.l
61.2
1+7.0
1919 - 1928 77.0
1929 - 1938 78.3 95.7
1939 - 19i;8 179.3 105.6
19U9 - 1958 323.1 207.il
Reproduced from J. F. Weston's article, "The Stock
Market in Perspective," Harvard Business Review, March-April
1956, p. 76.
Figures for gross national product come from: First
column, first 12 decades, Simon Kurnets, "Long-Term Changes
In the National Income of the United States of America Since
1870," International Association for Research in Income and
Wealth, Income and Wealth: Series 11, (Cambridge, England:
Bowes and Bowes, Publishers, Ltd., 1952), p. 30; last 5
decades. Economic Report of the president, January 1955;
second column, U. S. Department of Commerce, Historical
Statistics of the United States and Survey of Current
Business."^
^Footnote 1: op. c i
t
. , p. 217.
Chart 5
31
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Exhibit ii. Relationship nET\vEEN Standahd & Poor's Industrial
Index (1935-1939 = 100) and cross national product
^
(In billions of dollars)
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Source: Weston, J. F. "The Stock-iv'arket in Persoect i ve"
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, 19i?'6,
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32
GNP and the rate of growth of stock prices. He has shown
that over a period of about eighty years (l87i| to 1955)
"... the real growth in stock values has proceeded at about
two-thirds of the rate of real growth in gross national pro-
duct."^
Tables 3 and l\. (on pages 33 and 3l|) have been taken
from Mr. Solomon's study. Table 3 shows GNP and stock prices
In current and constant prices and indicated rates of real
growth in GNP for two periods. Indicated rate of growth Is
the average real growth in GNP in a particular period.
Table k shows warranted stock prices and growth rates of
stock prices for two different periods. Warranted stock
prices have been computed In such a way as to result in a
rate of growth in stock values equal to two-thirds of the
rate of growth in GNP, when both stock values and GNP are in
terms of constant dollars. The grouping of the years while
computing Indicated rates of real growth in GNP and the
growth rates of stock prices has been on the basis of the
rate of economic growth. Consecutive years with similar
rates of growth have been put In the same category.
The results of Etra Solomon's study supports the conten-
tion of this paper that business conditions have a strong
influence on stock prices over a long period of time. The
exact quantitative relationships of the two are not directly
hbld., p. 217.
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Table 3
Gross National Product in Current anc1 Constant prices
(Annual rates in billi ons of dollars)
Period Indicated Indicated
Current Price In constant rates of trend of
prices Index prices 1955 real growth real growth
1874 - 1883 $ 9 $ 35.75 25.6 25.6
1879 - 1888 10.7 32.31 33.1 31.1
1884 - 1893 11.8 29.96 39.4 37.7
1889 - 1898 12.7 27.61 46.0 4 percent 45.9
1894 - 1903 15.9 28.20 56.4 55.9
1899 - 1908 21.7 31.14
34.06
69.7 per annum 68.0
1904 - 1913 28.6 83.9 82.7
1909 - 1913 12,2 35.80 89.9 89.9
1909 - 1913
"{{'%'
35.80 100 100.0
1914 - 1918 55.6 46.41 119.8 115.9
1919 - 1923 85.1 63.59 133.8 134.U
1924 85.6 58.57 146.3 146.9
1925 90.3 60.08 150.3 151.3
1926 96.4 60.63 159.0 155.8
1927 94.9 59.46 159.6 160.5
1928 97.9 58.75 166.6 3 percent 165.3
1929 103.8 58.75 176.6 170.2
1930 - 1934 69.2 49.20 140.7 per annum 186.0
1935 - 1939 84.2 48.62 173.2 215.6
1940 - 194i+ 159.2 59.90 266.2 250.0
1945 - 1949 235.3 79.90 295.1 289.8
1950 - 1954 337.3 96.55 349.3 336.0
1955 369.0 100.00 369.0 367.1
Source: Ezra SoloiitonI, "Economic Growth and Common Stoc k Values ,"
University of Chlcag 0, Journal of Business, Ju ly 1955,
p. ;216.
3k
Tabl e h
Industrial Stock prices: Standard and Poor's Index
(1935-39 = 100) convertec1 to constant 1955 dollars.
Period Actual Warranted Growth rates
167U - 1663 $ 56.3 $ 56.3
1879 - 1888 65.6 6U.2
188I+ - 1693 82.8 73.3 2.667 percent
1889 - 1698 90.2 63.6
I89I1 - 1903 98.9 95.1+ per annum
1899 - 1908 111.0 108.8
1901+ - 1913 118.7 121+. 1
1909 - 1913 125.9 130.8
1911+ - 1918 129.7 11+1+ .1+
1919 - 1923 95.6 159.1+
; 1921+ 107.5 169.2
1925 132.8
lfi8.9
172.6
1926 176.0
1927 179.9 179.5 2 percent
1928 237.0 183.1
1929 291.1 186.8 per annum
1930 - 1931+ 152.6 198.2
1935 - 1939 205.5 218.8
191+0 - 191+1+ li+9.0 21+1.6
191+5 - 191+9 161+.9 266.7
1950 - 1951+ 208.2 29I+.5
1955 308.3 312.5
Source: Ezra Solomon, "Economic Growth and Common Stock
Values," Journal of Business, University of Chicago,
July 1955, p. 217.
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comparable, however, because (1) the periods used are differ-
ent and (2) Solomon's computation relates the rates of growth
in GNP and stock prices whereas the regression equation
shown above indicates the effect of a change in GNP on stock
prices.
Examination of the Reliability of the
predictive Value of the Equation
The examination of the reliability of the predictive
value of the equation can be conducted only on an expost
basis. The period selected for this purpose is 1926 to 1955«
This period is split into three groups on the basis of over
and undervaluation of stocks.^ The regression line in
Chart 5» page 31, shows the stock prices associated with
various levels of GNP that have been computed from the re-
gression equation.
It may be noted that the test of the equation makes use
of yearly figures of stock prices and GNP while the equation
was derived from ten-year averages of these variables. The
purpose of the test is to determine (1) the extent to which
prices of the stocks computed on the basis of the equation
differ from the actual prices and (2) whether or not some
logical explanation can be found when differences occur.
Mn this paper, stocks are referred to as undervalued
when the actual stock prices fall below the regression line.
This means that actual stock prices are not ashigh as they
should have been on the basis of present earnings. Over-
valuation of stocks means that stock prices are above what
they should have been based on earnings.
36
In cases of a deviation of the computed prices from the
actual prices, the test may show that there is a tendency of
the actual prices to approximate again the computed prices
when the factors that were temporarily strong enough to
cause the deviation lose their force. Many extraneous
factors affect stock prices temporarily, but their influence
wears out in the long run. As their influence vanishes,
there is a tendency for stock prices to be regulated again
primarily by earnings.
In the present paper earnings alone have been considered
as the permanent causal factor. Confidence and optimism
that are so important in the determination of stock prices
are based largely on earnings in the long run. The prospects
of better earnings create optimism.^
It might be noted that the explanations given for the
deviations of the computed prices from the actual prices do
not constitute an absolute proof. Yet these explanations
appear plausible enough in the light of the past events to
be considered as reasonable and logical.
There are several factors that influence stock prices
temporarily but their influence wears out in the long run.
For the present paper, such factors have not been considered
because the purpose of this paper is to show the relation-
ship of stock prices with those factors that have long run
influence on stock prices.
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Period 1926 to 1929
Chart 5 shows that the computed stock price in the year
1926 was on the regression line but beginning with 192?
stocks were overvalued. The overvaluation of stocks con-
tinued until 1929 when the great crash took place. The
iinprccedentcd rise in stock prices and their overvaluation
may be explained through the following facts:
Increase in Earnings . The following table shows that
GNP and earnings increased during this period which probably
helped build up confidence and optimism in the stock market.
Year Description of Year GNP Corporate
profits
1925 Upswing 8l.8 Figures
1926 Prosperity with slight reces- 86. 1| are
sion in second half not
1927 Slight recovery, then recession 85.8 available
1928 Upswing 90.2 98.2
1929 Boom and collapse 93.6 lOl+.U
The increase in earnings and GNP has been substantial
during this period (i.e. from 1926 to 1929) which might have
created an anticipation of better earnings and GNP. This in
turn possibly built up confidence and optimism in the stock
market that contributed to the rapid increase in the stock
prices. The increase in stock prices was faster than the in-
crease in earnings and GNP. Apparently other factors also
temporarily helped this boom.
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Thus viewed, the stock market is but a mirror
which, perhaps as In this instance, somewhat be-
latedly, provides an image of the underlying or
fundamental economic situation. Cause and effect
run from the economy to the stock market, never
the reverse.
1
Once the fact was realized in late 1929 that stock prices
were not in line with earnings, direction of movement of
prices was reversed. The rate of fall of stock prices then
was determined by various factors operating in the market.
The realization of the fact that stock prices were out of
line with earnings took time because this had to be realized
by the market as a whole whose psychology no one could pre-
dict with precision.
Faulty Monetary Policy . The failure of the Federal
Reserve Board to pursue a correct credit and monetary policy
was monumental during this period. J. K. Galbraith observes:
The Federal Reserve Board in those times was
a body of startling incompetence.
2
Early in the twenties the volume of broker's
loans--because of their liquidity they are often
referred to as call loans or loans in the call
market—varied from a billion to a billion and a
half dollars. By early 1926 they had increased
to two and a half billions and remained at about
that level for most of the year. During 192?
there was another increase of about a billion
dollars, and at the end of the year they reached
3,i|8o,7eo,000. This was an incredible sum, but
it was only the beginning. In the two dull winter
months of 1928 there was a small decline and then
expansion began in earnest. Broker's loan reached
^J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crash , 1929, p. 93.
^J. K. Galbraith, 0£. cit ., p. 32.
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four billion on the first of June 1928, five billion
on the first of November, and by the end of the year
they were well along to six billion. Never had there
been anything like It before.! (gee Chart 6a, page
1*0.)
In the spring of 1926, Montagu Norman, Governor of the
Bank of England, HJalmar Sehacht, Governor of the Reichbank
and Charles Rist, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of France
came to the United States (because of monetary trouble at
home) to urge for an easy money policy in the United States.
The Federal Reserve Board complied with the request and cut
the rediscount rate from k percent to 3.5 percent. This
made money easily available in a speculative market, which
helped to worsen the situation. When the Reserve Board
realized the gravity of the situation it could not do any-
thing under the pressure of business community and conserva-
tive political elements that had come into power. Not until
August 1929 did the Board Increase the rediscount rate to six
percent. The impact of this action was nullified because of
a simultaneous easing of the buying rates on acceptances.
Poor Knowledge of Economics . Unfortunately, during this
period, economists In general were in error on major economic
Issues, professor Irving Fisher commented: "Stock prices
have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau."
M. K. Galbraith, o£. cit
. , p. 26.
'^Quoted from J. K. Galbr
The Great Crash, 1929, p. 75.
^Quot aith, "Wall Street and Washington,"
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In November 1929 the Harvard Economic Society predicted
"a severe depression like that of 1920-21 Is outside the
range of probability. We are not facing protracted liqui-
dation." Lawrence of Princeton wrote:
The consensus of judgement of the millions
whose valuations function on that admirable market,
the Stock Exchange, is that stocks are not at
present over valued
. . . Where is that group of
men with all-embracing v/isdom which will entitle
them to veto the judgement of this intelligent
multitude?!
The poor knowledge of economics is evident when national
policies based on a balanced budget (which meant at that
time higher taxes and reduced federal spending), misplaced
fear of inflation, absence of low interest rates and plenti-
ful credit are v/itnessed In the ^.vake of a depression.
Public officials, bankers and politicians also played a
part in building up confidence in the stock market. In June
1929, the official optimist Bernard Barauch said publicly
"the economic condition of the world seems on the verge of
a great forward movement."- Andrew W. Mellon (a cabinet
member) said "There is no cause for v/orry. The high tide
of prosperity will continue."^ Lost magazines end newspapers
in 1929 reported the upward sweep of the market with admira-
tion and av/e and without alarm.
hbid .
J. K. Galbraith, American Magaelne, June 1929, p. 75.
^J. K. Galbraith, 0£. cit ., p. 20.
k2
J. K. Galbralth observes, "The fact was that American
enterprise in the twenties had opened its hospitable arms to
an exceptional number of promoters, grafters, sv/indlers,
impostures and frauds."^ Examples of ivar Kreuger,
John J. Raskobe and many others can be cited.
One of the most outstanding developments of the time
that gave a big push to stock prices was Mr. John Raskobe»s
idea of investment and trust. During 1928, approximately
186 Investment trusts were organized whose purpose was to
collect money from the public (especially from small inves-
tors who. In general, did not have enough knowledge about
particular stocks in which money could be invested most
profitably) and invest it in stocks. By the beginning of
1929, they were promoted at the rate of one a day; a total
of 265 were formed during the year. The trusts sold about
$1^00,000,000 worth of their securities to the public in 1927,
and in 1929 an additional of $3,000,000,000. By t.he autumn
of 1929, the total assets of the investment trusts were
estimated to exceed $8,000,000,000. The huge resources of
trusts were used to buy stocks. This was an important
reason why the stock prices were pushed so high.
^J, K. Galbraith, o£. cit ., p. 1|9.
U3
The 1930-19ltl Period
After the crash In 1929, stock prices started falling
rapidly, and the fall continued until 1932. The share price
index fell from 189.1; in 1929 to 1^0.6 in 1930, to 87.I+ in
1931 and to U6.5 in 1932. Stocks were still overvalued com-
pared to regression line in 1930 end 1931 because (1) prices
in 1929 had shot up so high that it took some time before
they fell enough to be in line with earnings and (2) earnings
and GNP themselves were falling rapidly. In terirs of con-
stant 1929 prices, GNP fell from t9k billion in 1929 to |56
billion in 1932.
In 1932 stock prices had fallen enough to be very close
to the regression line and they subsequently increased
parallel to the increase in earnings and GNP. From 1931 to
19^1 (as the observations on Chart 5 indicate) stock prices
remained remarkably close to the regression line. Thus in
the decade 1931 to 191^1 com.puted prices are very close to
the actual prices. Complete equality between computed prices
and actual prices was not possible because (1) temporarily,
many factors are able to influence stock prices and (2) the
computed prices are on the basis of a long-terr: relationship
while the actual prices are average annual figures.
The 19lj2-1955 Period
During the period 19i|2-1955, actual stock prices were
considerably lower than computed stock prices. In 1953,
kk
actual prices showed a tendency to catch up (see Chart 6b,
page l^$) and by 1955 they had come close to computed prices.
There was a sharp increase in GNP from 111 billion in
1938 to $183.6 billion in 19Ui| (see Charts 7a and 7B, pages
i;6 and 1|7 respectively) and after an interval of four years
there was another increase from $171.1 billion in 19i|9 to
$230.8 billion in 1955. Corporate earnings and dividends,
the money supply and the general price level also increased
in this period (sec Table 1 and Charts 8 and 9, pages I6,
i|8, and 1|9) . But the stock market did not respond immediately.
Thus, stock prices, though rising, lagged behind the levels
achieved by the rest of the economy. Several possible
reasons can be cited for this laggerdly behavior of stock
prices.
The Second World War boosted GNP during the early
forties, but that was only a temporary factor. For a
capitalistic economy like that of the United States, there
was no ready solution to the problem of maintaining the
economy at high level of activity. In the first place,
there was no unanimity of opinion (which has not been
achieved even today) among the economists themselves about
the answer to the question of how to maintain a high level
of business activity. Secondly, even if they had an answer,
what credibility could have been given to it after taking
into account their performance in the thirties. Thirdly,
what guarantee was there that the politicians would accept
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the answer of the economists, assuming economists had the
right answers to the problems. (Even today, the propriety
of the national debt and budget deficits are questioned.)
There was every reason to be skeptical about the permanence
of the economic boom of the war period. An Important ques-
tion for the United States today is how to support the
economy if a complete disarmament is accepted and defense
expenditures of $55 billions are reduced to a meagre figure
of a few billions. This apprehension is fully supported in
the light of the developments that have taken place after the
war. Immediately after the tempo of expenditures slowed,
towards the end of the war, the economy slipped backward.
From $183.6 billion in 19iti|, GNP dropped to $l80,9 billion
in 19i|5 despite the fact that the war continued until about
the middle of 19U5. The full impact of the end of the war
on the economy was realized in 19^6 when GNP declined sharply
to $166.8 billion. Immediately after 19i|6, experts on this
matter forecasted stagnation and depression. Depression
succeeds boom was an almost unchallenglble dogma at that time.
The end of the war, the low level of the economy (not until
1950 did GNP attain the level of I9I4I4) and the economists
»
prophecy of an impending depression may explain the low
stock prices that prevailed until the second half of 19!|9.
Economists made remarkable progress during the period
1932 to 1950. Keynsian economics was not only a revolution
in economic theory but in its practical effectiveness as well.
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After Roosevelt was elected to the presidency, principal
tenets of Keynsian economics were applied to solve economic
problens. The results were highly encouraging.
By 1950, Keynslen economics had been further extended
and tested. The effectiveness of national economic policies
was tested in the 19i|5-1950 downturn and its immediate re-
covery. The outbreak of the Korean War during the early
phase of the recovery tended to cast some doubt on econo-
mists' ability to make the economy resume and sustain a high
level of growth on its own. Many persons legitimately
doubted If the quick recovery from recession was because of
the effectiveness of the economic policies to avert the
depression or because the outbreak of hostilities required
higher expenditure for defense purposes. The effects of
larger war expenditures were intermingled with the effects
of the economic policies which had been adopted to avert
depression.
The old question of "what after war?" still remained
unanswered and people were skeptical about the permanence of
economic growth. Although economists in general did not
predict a depression after 1950 as they did before 19i;9,
people did not find conclusive evidence of the effectiveness
of the application of economic theory In averting a depression.
The possibility of a depression and people's attitude concern-
ing economists' ability to avert It in 1950, 1951, and 1952
was similar to the situation immediately after the Second
52
World War. Despite the fact that GNP Increased from $187.1
billion to $206.7 billion in 195?, stock prices did not
Increase proportionately (see Chart 6b) .
The long awaited test came during the 1953-5I| recession.
The effectiveness of national econopic policies against the
recession indicate economists' ability to handle such situa-
tions. Possibly this helped to build optlrrlsm and confidence
In the economy and the stock market. Stock prices rose
rapidly and came close to the computed prices. (Actual
prices came quite close to the computed prices in 195i|)
.
In 19^5, this trend continued.
The following facts are important In explaining the
rapid increase in stock prices and their returning to approxi-
mately computed prices. They helped build confidence and
optimism In the stock market which pushed their prices high
enough to be in line with earnings.
1. The effective control of the 1953-5U recession
was an important factor, especially when viewed
against the widely held opinion in early 195U
that the long awaited test had come.
2. The revision of internal revenue code and the
tax relief given to corporations and to dividend
recipients was unquestionably Important in con-
tinuing the growth of the economy,
3. The revival of monetary policy as a prime in-
strument of control and the very sharp fall in
s?>
long-term Interest rates In 1953-5i| that it
brought were also demand-creating factors in
the stock market.
1|. The Employment Act of 19l|6 gave the President
more power to interfere in the economic affairs
of the country. Fiscal and monetary policies
can now be resorted to more easily.
5. The probable upward shift of the consumption
function in the United States might be another
stabilizing factor In the economy. This was
true particularly after the Second World War
when the demand for goods and services which
had been restrained during the war period was
allowed to be satisfied. This might have helped
revive the economy from a low level of economic
activity during 19^6.
The optimism and confidence in the growth of the economy
and stock prices Is reflected In the institutional changes
in a stock market since 1950. Chart 10 (page Sk) shows the
flight of individual Investors away from and the movement of
pension funds Into the stock market; the latter more than
compensating for the loss caused by the exit of individuals.
Since 1950, the movement of pension funds Into the stock
market and of Individuals out of it has been Increasing.
The outward movement of individuals does not indicate a lack
of faith in the stock market, although the Inward movement
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by pension funds docs indicate more faith. The reason for
this is that Individuals got out because (1) they were able
to get a high return (as much as 5 percent) In savings
deposits with banks and (2) the pattern of their needs is
such that stocks were not suited to ther as a r^eans of
investment because most low income individuals cannot make
long-term investments and short-term investments in stocks
are too risky. Various studies have shown that the flight
of the individuals in income brackets under $10,000 a year
from the stock market has been overwhelmingly large in com-
parison to the individuals in the income brackets above
$20,000. For example, a Fortune study showed ".
. .a steady
and deep decline In the proportion of investors with income
under $10,000 — a decline much too steep to be accounted
for by inflation and generally rising income level of
Americans.**^ It should be noted that big investors have not
left the stock market.
For obvious reasons, the movement of non-insured pension
funds into the market is an indication of more faith in the
growth of the economy and stock market by financial institu-
tions whose Judgement of economic situations is more reliable
than that of a layman.
Daniel Seligman and T. A, Wise, Fortune , February 1961;,
p. 95.
Smfl^AARY AMD CONCLUSIONS
The following are the conclusions of the study:
First, business conditions and stock prices are very
closely related. Business conditions determine earnings and
earnings determine stock prices. Earnings Influence stock
prices through both dividends and retained earnings.
Second, the above relationship is much closer over the
long run. In the short run, it may not hold. The regres-
sion equation derived from the ten-year averages of GNP and
Standard and poor's Long-Term Industrial Stock Price Index
did not always predict accurately the actual yearly stock
prices.
Third, many factors influence stock prices temporarily
and they may appear more important in influencing stock
prices than business conditions. However, these factors
lose their force in the long run and stock prices are again
regulated by business conditions. In the expost test of the
regression equation, extraordinary developments were suggested
as possible causes of the deviations of actual prices from
the regression line.
Fourth, on a priori basis, business conditions were
assumed to be the cause and stock prices the effect over the
long run, Emperical evidence supports the validity of this
assumption. There is some possibility of a feedback but it
appears to be too small to be discernible.
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The study has some practical Implications for investors.
It supports the idea that, in a growing economy, investment
in stocks in general can be profitable in the long run
despite temporary fluctuations in stock prices.
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The report examines the relationship between business
conditions and stock prices, both theoretically and em-
pirically on a long term basis. It attempts to answer the
following questions*
1. Do business conditions affect stock prices over
the long run?
2, If the answer to question one Is in the affirma-
tive, what is the nature of this effect?
Theoretically, the relationship between business con-
ditions and stock prices is established through earnings.
An attempt is made to shov/ that business conditions affect
earnings and earnings affect stock prices. Thus, business
conditions indirectly affect stock prices. The theoreti-
cally established relationship has been tested empirically.
Operationally defining business conditions as Gross
National product, the correlation is computed between ten-
year averages of GNP and ten-year averages of Standard and
Poor's Long-Term Industrial Index for the period I669 to
1955* The correlation computations result in an r of
+ .8872 which is significant at five percent level.
A linear regression equation is computed from the ten-
year averages of GNP and Standard and Poor's Long-Term
Industrial Index for the same period of time with stock
prices as the dependent variable. The reliability of the
predictive power of the equation Is tested on an expost
basis for the period of 1926-1955. The regression equation
Is found to be a good expression of the relationship between
average annual stock prices and average annual GNP for the
period. In cases where there are differences between com-
puted stock prices and actual stock prices, extraordinary
developments are suggested as the probable causal factors
that temporarily pushed actual stock prices av/ay from com-
puted ones.
The findings of the study support the thesis that
business conditions through earnings determine stock prices,
over the long run.
1
